Death penalty for “terrorism“ and mass sentences for helping political prisoners: review of the fight against “extremism“ in Belarus for July–September 2024

Human Constanta
13 November 2024

This review highlights the key trends in state policy against “extremism” and “terrorism” in Belarus and its impact on human rights from July to September 2024.

During this period, state agencies and state-controlled media continued to employ “anti-extremist” legislation as a tool for widespread human rights violations and persecution of civil society representatives and individuals perceived as disloyal to the Belarusian or Russian political regimes.

From July to September 2024, Human Constanta documented at least 142 new criminal cases and 119 sentences based on “extremist” grounds, not including cases related to participation in peaceful protests or insults against officials. In total, approximately 800 human rights violations were documented over three months due to “anti-extremist” legislation implementation, including at least 310 sentences in related criminal cases and at least 135 administrative detentions.

For the first time, the maximum penalty under “extremism” charges was recorded during the monitoring period: the death sentence. For the first time in Human Constanta’s monitoring history, a death sentence was handed down to a foreign citizen, Riko Krieger, for “participation in terrorist activity”; however, he was later pardoned and handed over to the German authorities. The period was also marked by numerous trials concerning sabotage in Belarus allegedly conducted under the “patronage of Ukrainian special services,” with charges including “acts of terrorism“ and “high treason.” For some of these cases, the accused also face the death penalty.

An amnesty of at least 115 political prisoners convicted on “extremist” grounds was carried out during this period, primarily benefiting women, the elderly, and seriously ill individuals. Despite these releases, the authorities continue the policy of mass arrests and persecution of disloyal citizens. More people were detained during the reporting period than were pardoned.

The article on “incitement of enmity” continued to be used to prosecute individuals for critical and anti-war comments and for providing personal data of law enforcement officers to opposition resources. During the period, arrests were reported for comments justifying attacks on police officers due to their involvement in human rights violations.

The period was also marked by ongoing “conveyor” trials in absentia against activists and opposition leaders abroad under conspiracy charges. The authorities intensified arrests of alleged administrators of independent socio-political Telegram channels, along with mass repressions against associations with educational initiatives deemed “extremist formations.” For the first time, members of a religious movement referred to as a “sect” by pro-government sources were subjected to persecution under “extremist” grounds.

Traditional “conveyor“ trials were held on charges of “distribution of extremist materials.” In the Lenin District of Hrodna alone, around 250 such cases were recorded. For the first time, human rights defenders documented the use of forced labor as punishment for those detained on charges of “distribution of extremist materials.” Additionally, individuals were increasingly prosecuted for tattoos on their bodies that signified a negative stance toward the police.

The list of “extremist materials” was primarily supplemented by personal Instagram and “X” pages of opposition politicians, human rights defenders, and activists, as well as various Ukrainian media resources. Non-governmental organizations, including educational ones, were increasingly included in the list of “extremist formations.” For the first time in a long while, the list of “terrorist organizations” was updated to include a Belarusian organization – a unit of Belarusians fighting in Ukraine against Russian aggression. It was reported that during the period, the authorities blocked more than 5,000 resources belonging to independent media, NGOs, and opposition movements. Prosecutorial workers have increased propaganda events in educational institutions and state enterprises, where they discuss the “genocide of the Belarusian people” and intimidate the public with the responsibilities for “extremist” crimes and violations.

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Changes in legislation

The reporting period saw several amnesties in which people convicted of “extremist“ crimes were released.

On July 3, 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed the Law “On Amnesty in Connection with the 80th Anniversary of the Liberation of Belarus from Nazi Invaders.” Human rights defenders know of at least 18 political prisoners who were released. According to the law, criminal penalties could be reduced for minors, pregnant women, people with disabilities, or serious illnesses; however, the amnesty was not intended to apply to individuals on the “extremists” or “terrorists” lists or those convicted of certain political offenses under the Criminal Code. Nonetheless, at least 18 released political prisoners were known to human rights defenders. Among those released were four women and 14 men, including opposition politician Ryhor Kastusyou, sentenced to 10 years for “participation in a conspiracy”; Darya Losik, wife of political prisoner journalist Ihar Losik, convicted for giving an interview to an “extremist” media outlet; Sviaatlana Lupach, daughter of journalist Zmitser Lupach, convicted for participating in peaceful protests; Palina Palavinka, wife of journalist Zmitser Luksha, convicted for creating journalistic materials that “discredited Belarus“; Katsyaryna Madziankova and Tamara Ostreyka, convicted for participating in peaceful protest actions. Some prisoners were released by amnesty and others by personal pardon from Lukashenka.

On August 16, 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed another decree pardoning 30 political prisoners. According to pro-government sources, among those pardoned were 14 women and 16 men, some of whom have serious illnesses or are elderly. Pro-government activist Yury Vaskrenski reported 900 clemency requests from political prisoners submitted to the Belarusian authorities. It is known that he called the relatives of political prisoners, informed them of the conditions for clemency, and encouraged them to write petitions. On August 22, 2024, the BYSOL Emergency Humanitarian Aid Service reported the release of 22 political prisoners, including journalists Kseniya Lutskina and Zmitser Luksha; trade union activist Vasil Berasnieu; Iryna Sankouskaya, Alena Stabrouskaya, Ala Zueva, Katsyaryna Leu, Natallya Pyatrovich, Tamara Karavai, Yauhen Chumila, Pavel Kuchynski, convicted for internet comments; Volha Novikava and Svyatlana Palyuektava, convicted for participating in peaceful protests. Requests for clemency from political prisoners before Lukashenka’s decrees are considered by the “Commission for the Review of Appeals from Citizens of the Republic of Belarus Abroad on Their Violations of the Law,” headed by the Prosecutor General.

On September 4, 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed another decree, No. 343, “On the Pardon of Convicted Persons,” under which he pardoned 30 more people convicted of “crimes“ related to peaceful protests. Among those pardoned were seven women and 23 men, most of whom are parents of minor and young children. According to Prosecutor General Andrei Shved, these individuals “were mainly convicted of insult and defamation on the internet.” As of the evening of September 5, 2024, human rights defenders know the names of seven people released at this stage of the pardon, including Viktoriya Haurylina, Dziyana Zavadskaya, and Maryna Kisialevich.

On September 16, 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed another decree pardoning another 37 political prisoners ahead of “National Unity Day” on September 17, 2024. Among those pardoned were six women, as well as people with chronic illnesses or disabilities and elderly individuals. Pro-government media called the release of political prisoners “another act of humanity on the part of the state toward those who have erred” and indicated that further pardons should be discussed with representatives of Western countries, who should offer “something in return” and “respond with positive actions.” By the evening of September 18, 2024, human rights defenders knew the names of all 37 individuals released at this stage of the pardon, including:

Thus, in four stages of clemency starting July 3, 2024, 115 political prisoners were released. However, the releases affected a small fraction of the total number of arbitrarily detained and unjustly convicted individuals on “extremism” and “terrorism” charges.

On August 12, 2024, a draft Law “On Amendments to the Codes on Criminal Liability Issues” was published. The law proposes adding a new article 375-3 to the CC (“Unauthorized Dissemination of Information on the Location or Movement of Military Units, Armaments, Military Equipment, and Ammunition”). The article provides for liability for “dissemination of information about the location or movement of units, armaments, military equipment, and ammunition of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, other troops, and military formations of the Republic of Belarus within the territory of the Republic of Belarus, if such information has not been officially distributed, committed during a counter-terrorism operation, a state of emergency, or martial law, without indications of crimes provided for in articles 356 (“high treason”), 358 (“espionage”), and 373 (“intentional disclosure of state secrets”).” The article prescribes penalties in the form of a fine, or arrest, or restriction of liberty for up to three years, or imprisonment for the same period. If the above-mentioned actions are committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy, for selfish motives, or result in serious consequences, the article provides for punishment in the form of restriction of liberty for up to five years or imprisonment for up to six years. Previously, actions involving the transmission of data on the movement of military equipment or the location of military facilities to opposition organizations or foreign intelligence services were prosecuted under articles 361-4 CC (“aiding extremist activities”) and 356 IC (“high treason”), respectively. The new article prescribes a milder penalty compared to article 361-4 of the CC, making it likely that the former will be applied as an additional qualification in cases of transferring military information to opposition organizations and thus increase the prison term imposed.

The “Commission for the Review of Appeals from Citizens of the Republic of Belarus Abroad on the Violation of the Law” also continues to operate not only to review clemency petitions for political prisoners but also to fulfill its original task – aiding in the return of political emigrants to Belarus. On August 23, 2024, it was reported that a meeting of this commission was held, during which various appeals from unnamed applicants were considered. As a result, “decisions were made to inform the applicants about the absence, as of the date of their appeal to the Commission, of any initiated administrative process, criminal case, or decisions recognizing them as suspects or indicting them.”

Criminal Prosecution

This section provides information on new criminal cases and sentences under the “extremist” articles of the CC, specifically Articles 130, 130-1, 130-2, 289, 290-1, 290-2, 356, 357, 361, 361-1, 361-2, 361-3, 361-4, 369-1, as well as observed trends in this field.

Article 130 of the CC “Incitement of racial, national, religious, or other social enmity or discord”

“Leaks” of personal data of government officials and law enforcement officers (The Black Book of Belarus and other cases)

Courts continued to issue harsh sentences for sharing information about the residences and phone numbers of government officials and law enforcement officers to the Black Book of Belarus (BBB) – an initiative aimed at de-anonymizing those in power accused of human rights abuses. Most accusations related to “leaks” involve two articles – Article 130 (“incitement of enmity“) and Article 203-1 of the CC (“illegal actions concerning private life information and personal data“), which is formally “non-extremist.“ The latter was introduced to enforce the 2021 “Data Protection Law” but has since turned into a repressive tool used to punish people for spreading information on the regime’s crimes. During the reporting period, three sentences were issued under Article 130 in this connection:

  • On July 2, 2024, the Homiel Regional Court sentenced local resident Dzianis Zhelezka;
  • On July 11, 2024, a sentence was reported for former VTB Bank employee Tatsyana Shynkevich, likely for providing data to the BBB. Human rights defenders are clarifying her sentence, though it is known she received a real prison term;
  • On August 2, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced former hospice director in Hrodna, Volha Vialichka, to nine years in prison on seven counts, including “incitement of enmity” and “illegal actions regarding private life information” under Articles 130 and 203-1 of the CC (in absentia).

Mass arrests of people who sent information to the BBB about government officials and law enforcement in 2020 also continued during this period. At the end of 2022, an agent of the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK) managed to access databases with collaborators’ personal data (approximately 8,500–10,000 individuals), which has resulted in ongoing mass arrests to this day. During the reporting period, at least nine arrests were reported, including:

  • A businessman, a former government employee who sent the BBB data on his former colleagues;
  • Belarusian Zmitser, who sent the BBB phone numbers and addresses of police officers who were clients of his employer;
  • A former employee of Belarusian Railways, who sent the BBB information on his colleagues;
  • A chef from a restaurant in Minsk, Aliaksei Piatrou, who sent the BBB information on his police officer neighbor;
  • An economist who sent information on a prosecutor he used to play billiards with to the BBB.

In addition, IT specialist Zmitser Marchuk, Belarusian Railways employee Aliaksandr Rymasheuski, a Minsk resident, and a long-distance driver and activist of the Belarusian diaspora in Poland were detained for sharing officials’ personal data. The latter was detained while crossing the border with Belarus.

Comments criticizing Belarusian law enforcement

At least 18 sentences were handed down over the three months for critical comments in messengers and social media about government officials and law enforcement. Charges were filed over statements with a negative tone toward both Belarusian and Russian law enforcement. Authorities interpret these statements as “incitement of other social enmity,” often combining the charges with “defamation” articles of the CC. Nearly all cases are conducted in closed sessions, with government bodies publishing vague information on court proceedings, leaving details of many cases unknown.

  • On July 12, 2024, the sentence of multi-child mother Nadzeja Laptienok (Azhhyrenka), handed down in late 2023, was reported. She was sentenced to six years in prison on several “defamation” charges and “incitement of enmity,” likely for critical comments about the government online;
  • On July 26, 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced Edvard Kashetsyan, Andrei Valakhnovich, and Uladzimir Alisevich for conversations in their group chat. It is known that Valakhnovich was sentenced to six years in prison;
  • On September 27, 2024, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced Natallya Mikulich to compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital with enhanced supervision for her social media posts in which she “accused law enforcement and government agencies of covering up pedophiles.”

Similar sentences were issued to Aksana Antonchanka, Aliaksandr Barkun, Yauhen Barysienka, Andrei Burdzienya, Aliaksandr Zalataryevich, Vital Kanurkin, Ruslan Kruchynin, Yauhen Kuznyatsou, Anton Lisichkin, Vadzim Lutsevich, Siarhei Naumau, Vadzim Nautsenya, Pavel Paulau, Vital Sauko, Anastasiya Sudzilouskaya, Anton Sharupa. Legal proceedings also began for similar charges against Homiel residents Zmitser Sidarenka and Iryna Stasenka, as well as political prisoners Yauhen Kladau, Yury Averkau, Siarhei Bely and former political prisoner Natallya Antonava.

At least 20 new criminal cases have been recorded. Known cases include criminal proceedings for comments such as “one of the protest march routes should be through the homes of the cops,” “they’re now on our territory, grab a bag, fill it with crap, and throw it into the middle of the column,” “burn them all,” “if they try to touch anyone, I’ll kill them… they’re criminals, not authorities,” “a cop isn’t human,” “forgot who you swore allegiance to; burn in hell,” “I served with him… Pasha, don’t fall for the red money, it’ll come back to haunt you,” “the OMON headquarters should be consecrated with holy fire,” “for you, you bast**d, a special cauldron is heated,” “it’s time to clean up the trash in your districts, it’s more effective to block the highways,” “beat the cops in the yards and throw them in the dumpster,” “who are GUBOPiK? They’re the real extremist organization,” “squash the scum. Crush the fascist vermin,” “hang them on a pole with a ‘fascist’ sign,” “we remember you and your scumbags,” “you and your thugs in uniform abuse people. Fascists,” “kill the bastard and their whole family,” “spineless clowns.” A Belarusian who posted tips on how to better resist the police in his comments was also reportedly detained.

The reporting period saw a series of sentences issued under Article 130 of the CC in absentia for individuals living abroad to avoid persecution. Most cases were initiated against less prominent activists who had posted comments online.

  • On July 29, 2024, the Vitebsk Regional Court sentenced Navapolatsk activist Andrei Zuyeu in absentia to seven years in prison for “incitement of enmity,” “mass riots,” “creating an extremist formation,” and “insulting a representative of the authorities” under Articles 130, 293, 361-1, and 369 of the CC.
  • On August 6, 2024, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced businessman from Pastavy, Ihar Porunkevich, who raised funds to support protesters, in absentia to six years in prison for “incitement of enmity,” “aiding extremist activities,” “threatening to use violence against a police officer,” and “insulting Lukashenka” under Articles 130, 361-4, 364, and 368 of the CC.
  • On August 14, 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced krav maga instructor Hennadz Kaptanau in absentia to six years in prison for “incitement of enmity,” “calls to harm national security,” and “insulting” Aliaksandr Lukashenka and state officials under Articles 130, 361, 368, and 369 of the CC.
  • The Homiel Regional Court sentenced paramedic from Zhlobin, Alina Halinskaya, in absentia to two years in prison for “incitement of enmity,” charging her with writing critical comments online. According to investigators, in 2020, she posted a message “inciting enmity” against the police and later posted anti-war statements on Telegram. Authorities deemed her message as “incitement to hatred and hostility toward the social group ‘Russian people.’”
  • Special procedures under this article were also initiated against popular stand-up comedian Slava Kamissaranka.
  • On September 23, 2024, the Minsk City Court began a criminal trial against the founder of the “New Vision” clinic, Aleh Kauryhin, on nine charges, including “incitement of enmity.”

Comments criticizing russian aggression against Ukraine

The practice of criminal prosecution for “incitement of national enmity” continues against individuals who criticize Russian aggression in Ukraine or leave negative comments about Russian soldiers or Russians in general. Reports indicate at least four detentions for sharp comments connected to the war, such as “we need to eliminate the ‘rashists’… it’s time to strike Russian cities,” “what scum… he’s just an orc,” and “waiting for you, guys, with impatience! Long live Belarus! Glory to Ukraine!” A resident of the Homiel region was also detained for allegedly “meeting Ukrainians in an online game” and “being influenced by them to insult Russia and the president of Belarus.” On July 8, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court issued a sentence against Ihar Sushko for comments in Telegram channels regarding Belarusian and Russian military personnel, with the specific sentence to be clarified.

Detentions have continued for online criticism of the authorities and support for Ukraine in online chat roulettes (websites allowing video conversations with random users). Law enforcement officers have continued to detain individuals based on videos recorded by pro-government bloggers, including Yury Kamar. Such bloggers, posing as Ukrainians, seek out people in chat roulettes who criticize Belarusian authorities and support Ukraine, provoking them to make sharp statements. These actions can be seen as provocations. Detentions include a resident of Barysau, who expressed a desire to fight on the side of Ukraine; a resident of Minsk, who “made derogatory comments about neighboring Russia;” a Belarusian who “spoke negatively about the Russian Federation and the current Belarusian government”; and two residents of Vitebsk, one of whom stated, “every scum will pay for what they’ve done,” and the other expressed a desire to “get a weapon from the military registration and enlistment office to show the people’s will.” Authorities also tracked a person who discussed the situation in Belarus with a real Ukrainian blogger in a chat roulette.

Comments on attacks against law enforcement officers

On September 23, 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) reported the detention of a resident of Mahiliou, Aliaksandr Kondrychin, who allegedly attacked GUBOPiK officers with a knife. According to law enforcement, GUBOPiK officers “identified a local resident involved in extremist activities,” and “during a preventive conversation, the man suddenly took out a knife and inflicted knife wounds on the police officers.” The injured officer received medical assistance, and the Mahiliou resident was detained. A criminal case has been initiated against him under Article 139 of the CC for attempted murder of police officers. Propaganda media later disputed the official version from the MIA, claiming that Kondrychin had been under long-term surveillance. After the incident, law enforcement conducted a raid on Mahiliou residents connected to the attacker. Human rights activists reported the detention of at least six local residents, including Kondrychin’s friends. Human rights defenders also documented detentions of individuals for online comments justifying the attack on police officers due to their involvement in human rights abuses – this led to the detentions of residents in Hrodna and Mahiliou. Special forces units in full combat gear carried out these detentions.

Article 130-1 of the CC “Rehabilitation of Nazism”

Law enforcement continued to use this article both to address genuine displays of Nazism and to prosecute individuals for expressing views on historical events that differ from the state’s official ideology. The maximum penalty under this article is 12 years in prison.

On July 8, 2024, the pro-government media outlet “BelTA” reported that the Mahiliou Regional Court sentenced a resident of Chausy to 1.5 years in prison. It was reported that the accused was “an adherent of Nazi ideology” and joined a Telegram group promoting similar views. Following instructions from the group’s “curators,” he allegedly inscribed Nazi slogans and symbols “aimed at popularizing the ideas of Nazism, neo-Nazism, and SS activities” in busy areas of Mahiliou in January 2024. It was also reported that sentences were issued against Aliaksandr Branovitsky and Ilya Zhurov.

On July 11, 2024, it was reported that the administrator of a VKontakte group, which posted photos of Adolf Hitler and Nazi symbols, was detained. In a “confessional” video, the man states that on social media he “discussed issues related to the Holocaust, considered the number of Jews who died during World War II to be exaggerated, and claimed that conditions for Jews in Auschwitz were overstated.”

Article 130-2 of the CC “Denial of the genocide of the Belarusian people”

During the reporting period, a criminal case under this article was referred to the court. This article is used to prosecute opinions on Belarusian history that contradict the official position of the authorities. The maximum penalty under this article is 10 years in prison.

On September 6, 2024, the Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office sent a criminal case to court involving a 54-year-old resident of the Minsk District, Andrei Savitsky, who was detained in March 2024. According to the prosecutor’s office, he was an administrator of a group on Odnoklassniki, where he “published a text denying the mass killing of peaceful residents of the village of Khatyn by soldiers of the 118th Schutzmannschaft battalion and the SS Dirlewanger Brigade during a punitive operation on March 22, 1943, when 149 citizens of the BSSR, including 75 children, were burned alive and shot.” For more on the law used to prosecute this individual, see Human Constanta’s report.

Article 289 of the CC “Act of terrorism”

This article continues to be applied in cases of direct actions against the authorities, all of which are treated by law enforcement as “acts of terrorism” regardless of the consequences or the damage caused. The maximum penalty under this article is 15 years in prison, but if the crime is committed by an organized group, the punishment can be up to 25 years, life imprisonment, or the death penalty. The death penalty can be applied even for preparation to commit an “act of terrorism.” Recently, state propaganda has regularly released films about terrorist attacks and sabotage allegedly organized by “Western” or Ukrainian intelligence services. In many cases, there is evidence of the state’s involvement in provoking such crimes, and some alleged “sabotage acts” appear to have been entirely staged.

On July 22, 2024, human rights defenders from HRC “Viasna” reported that a death sentence was handed down at the end of June to German citizen Rico Krieger. He was accused of “mercenary activities,” “act of terrorism,” “illegal actions regarding firearms,” “sabotage of transport routes,” “espionage activities,” and “participation in an extremist formation” under Articles 133, 289, 295, 309, 358-1, and 361-1 of the CC. This is the first death sentence for politically motivated actions classified by the authorities as “terrorism.” In Belarus, most death sentences are issued in cases involving the murder of one or more people. The sentence was not appealed and became legally binding. According to the propaganda media outlet “Belarus Today,” Krieger entered Belarus as a tourist with phones and a drone on October 4, 2023. According to the investigation, the Security Service of Ukraine instructed him to conduct reconnaissance in Asipovichy and photograph military facilities. He was then allegedly assigned to plant explosives on railway tracks at the Ozyeryshche station. After successfully gathering information and carrying out the explosion, he was detained on October 6, 2023. Human rights defenders reported that his case was also connected to the activities of the Kalinouski Regiment. On July 30, 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka decided to pardon him, and on August 1, 2024, he was returned to Germany as part of a prisoner exchange between the U.S., Germany, and Russia, with Belarus’ involvement.

On August 1, 2024, a special (in absentia) procedure was initiated against former OMON officer Pavel Kulazhenka, who is fighting against Russian aggression in Ukraine as part of Belarusian units, and former military officer Pavel Patekhin, whom law enforcement believes carried out a drone attack on an OMON base in Minsk in the fall of 2021. Both are charged under several “terrorist” articles of the CC, including “act of terrorism committed by a group,” “activities to create a terrorist organization,” and “organization of activities of a terrorist organization” under Articles 289, 290-4, and 290-5 of the CC. They face penalties up to the death penalty.

On August 12, 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced 24-year-old Valery Vodzin in absentia to 20 years in prison. He was accused of “illegal actions related to weapons,” “act of terrorism,” “illegal transfer of ammunition across borders,” “creation of an extremist formation,” and “participation in an armed conflict in a foreign country” under Articles 295, 289, 333-1, 361-1, and 361-3 of the CC. Along with him, the court sentenced four other individuals (Andrei Hryhoryeu, Viktoryia Volchak, Hanna Savachkina, and her mother Tatsyana Rusak) to 7–7.5 years in prison. On May 10, 2023, the ONT channel aired the film “Deadly Package,” describing the preparation of terrorist attacks by Ukrainian intelligence before the May 9 Victory Day celebrations. According to law enforcement, Valery Vodin, a Belarusian linked to the Kalinouski Regiment, asked his acquaintances to retrieve a package containing C4 explosives disguised as electric hotplates and then hide it in a cemetery and forest for future use in sabotage. Four people involved in moving the electric hotplates, most of whom were unaware of the explosives, were labeled as “suspects” in committing an “act of terrorism” and “high treason.”

New court cases under Article 289 of the CC have also been initiated against individuals previously unknown to human rights defenders. This includes an 18-year-old from Asipovichy, Alyaksei Fediziachkin (listed in court documents as a “person who committed a socially dangerous act”), and a 36-year-old resident of Brest, Zmitser Osiyuk. Both are charged with “act of terrorism committed by a group,” which could lead to a death sentence.

On August 19, 2024, the Minsk City Court began the trial for the “Machulishchy terror attack” – a drone strike on a Russian A-50 reconnaissance plane at the Machulishchy airfield on February 26, 2023. Twelve people are accused in the case, including those who merely transported the attacker or helped him find housing: Maksim Lapatsin, Andrei Stsiapurka, Aleh Sychou, Dzianis Sakalou, and Anastasiya Pilko were tried in person. The head of the former law enforcement group BYPOL, Aliaksandr Azarau (previously sentenced in absentia to 25 years in prison); executioner Mikalai Shvets, who was returned to Ukraine; as well as Vital Yakutsik, Ala Yatsuta, Yauheniya Tochytskaya, Mikhail Demin, and Siarhei Lopareu, were tried in absentia.

On September 26, 2024, the Homiel Regional Court also began the trial of Ukrainian citizens Siarhei and Pavel Kabarchuks in the “Security Service of Ukraine’ Saboteurs” case: according to law enforcement, they were paid to transport explosives across the border.

Article 290-1 of the CC “Financing terrorist activities”

Law enforcement can interpret any material donations to opposition and independent public initiatives recognized as “terrorist” organizations in Belarus (e.g., “Nexta,” “Cyber Partisans,” “BYPOL”) as “financing terrorist activities.” The penalty for this article ranges from 8 to 15 years in prison. In most cases, donations that are now being prosecuted were made long before the organizations were classified as “terrorist.”

On August 14, 2024, it became known that in March 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced 63-year-old manager of major pharmaceutical companies, Siarhei Sheleh, to 8.5 years in prison, although the details of the case remain unknown. A verdict was also issued for medic Timur Lazko in the Lieninski District Court of Brest, with the exact sentence being clarified by human rights defenders.

Article 290-2 of the CC “Aiding terrorist activities”

This article provides for up to 15 years in prison for any form of cooperation with opposition and public initiatives designated as “terrorist” in Belarus. On August 28, 2024, it was reported that a state institution employee from Hrodna was detained for allegedly transmitting information to the “NEXTA” channel, including videos of military equipment movements. In pro-government media outlets, the man was referred to as a “terrorist accomplice.”

Article 356 of the CC “High treason”

This article continues to be used to prosecute people, most often former government employees, who are alleged to have ties with opposition organizations. Nearly all trials under this article are held behind closed doors, so the specific charges remain unknown in most cases. The maximum penalty under this article is 15 years in prison, but if the crime is committed by an official, the article provides for up to 25 years, life imprisonment, or the death penalty. During the reporting period, the following convictions were reported under this article:

  • On July 12, 2024, the Minsk City Court issued sentences against former Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications Andrei Ivanou and former Head of the Finance Department of Housing, Transport, and Communications of the Ministry of Finance Aliaksandr Korziuk – the sentences issued by the court are still being clarified by human rights defenders.
  • On July 14, 2024, pro-government media reported that the head of the Republican Tourism Union, Aliaksandr Mirski, was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison for “high treason” under Article 356 of the CC. In the propaganda story, it was claimed that he had cooperated with Lithuania’s State Security Department for seven years, providing information on more than a hundred Belarusians and details of “several editions of the National Bank telephone directory.”
  • On August 14, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced police academy cadet Ilya Naryshkin, likely due to his connections with Belarusian volunteer units in Ukraine.
  • On September 30, 2024, it was reported that the Brest Regional Court sentenced an entire family from Baranavichy: Zmitser and Aksana Malochko were sentenced to 12 and 8 years in prison, respectively, under undisclosed charges.
  • There were also sentences for young people who were likely detained by security services on allegations of cooperation with foreign intelligence services and opposition organizations abroad. For example, on July 31, the Mahiliou Regional Court sentenced an 18-year-old resident of Bykhau, Stanislau Shapel, who had responded to an advertisement for work as a cash courier. His “employers” asked him to record a video expressing support for Ukrainian intelligence, which likely served as the basis for his charges. Additionally, on September 19, 2024, the same court sentenced a 19-year-old resident of Minsk, Daniil Harasim, to 10 years in prison for photographing missile and artillery sites and subsequently transferring these photos to Ukrainian intelligence services.
  • There was also a sentence for a dual citizen of Poland and Belarus, Raman Haluza.

During the reporting period, a series of trials began against individuals previously connected to law enforcement, including former police captain from Kobryn, Zmitser Peretolchin, and former police lieutenant colonel Yury Makhnach, who spoke publicly about torture at the Lida District Department of Internal Affairs in August 2020 (in absentia). A trial was also initiated against the former director of the Neman glass factory, Ihar Batsyan. Information surfaced about Catholic priest Heinrich Akalatovich, who was detained at the end of 2023 on charges of “high treason”; he is accused of transferring “classified information” to unknown persons, with damages estimated at approximately €1 million.

Article 357 of the CC “Conspiracy or other actions committed with the aim of seizing state power”

This article continues to serve as one of the grounds for prosecuting leaders of major opposition organizations and independent civil initiatives in absentia. Almost any independent political activity is equated with an “attempt to seize power through unconstitutional means.” The maximum penalty under this article is 15 years in prison.

On July 1, 2024, the Minsk Regional Court issued sentences in absentia for 20 representatives of Belarusian civil society, referred to as “Tsikhanouskaya’s analysts” in government reports – including analysts Ryhor Astapenia and Lesya Rudnik, political scientists Pavel Vusau and Andrei Kazakevich, politicians Aliaksandr Dabravolski and Hanna Krasulina, journalists Yury Drakakhrust and Hanna Lyubakova, as well as a number of other activists. They were sentenced to between 10 and 11.5 years in prison on charges of “incitement of enmity,” “conspiracy,” “calls to harm national security,” and “participation in an extremist formation” under Articles 130, 357, 361, and 361-1 of the CC.

On July 8, 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced a number of activists in absentia, including Volha Karach, Vadzim Dzmitrenak, politicians Veranika Tsapkala, Anatol Kotau, and Yauhen Vilski, to 12 years in prison on charges of “conspiracy,” “leadership of an extremist formation,” and “aiding extremist activities” under Articles 357, 361-1, and 361-4 of the CC. Additional fines totaling around $650,000 were also imposed.

A special (in absentia) procedure was also initiated against opposition blogger Anton Matolka on 14 charges under the CC. On September 2, 2024, a trial began against the founders of the Imaguru startup hub, Tatsuana Marynich and Anastasiya Khomiankova, as well as Yauhen Puhach, who will be tried in person – they are charged under 10 articles of the CC.

Article 361 of the CC “Calls for restrictive measures (sanctions), other actions aimed at causing harm to the national security of the Republic of Belarus”

This article continues to be used to prosecute individuals for any form of support for sanctions against the Belarusian regime, including comments made in messengers and on social networks. The maximum penalty under this article is 12 years in prison.

During the reporting period, five sentences were reported, including former ONT TV channel operator Anton Kazelski for comments in Telegram, which he had deleted long before the sentence; businessman Uladzimir Balabanovich for messages in the opposition chat “BChB-Trielit” (a local chat group for residents of Bohdanovicha Street in Minsk); 20-year-old resident of Minsk, Alyaksei Mazuka, also for comments in Telegram; Mikhail Halouko and Liudmila Deyneka. The sentences for these cases are being clarified by human rights defenders.

An in absentia trial also began against former journalists of the TUT.BY media outlet, who are safely abroad, including Volha Loyka, Alena Talkachova, and TUT.BY lawyer Katsyaryna Tkachenka, for their independent journalism. Other trials on unknown charges have begun against screenwriter Kiryl Vevel, former police officer Vilen Turgunou, who actively spoke on political topics on social media and supported Ukraine; Uladzimir Baslyka, as well as former political prisoner from Baranavichy Vital Korshun and Aleh Viartinsky, who is already imprisoned on unrelated charges.

Article 361-1 of the CC “Creation of an extremist formation or participation in it”

This article continues to be used to suppress any forms of social self-organization that are not aligned with the regime. Participation in an “extremist formation” is punishable by up to 6 years in prison, while creating an “extremist formation” carries a penalty of up to 10 years.

At least 11 cases of criminal prosecution during the reporting period were connected to registrations in the Telegram bot of the opposition initiative “Plan Peramoga.” Most of the detentions continued to target individuals who had registered specifically in “fake” bots controlled by law enforcement. Registration in either the official bot of the initiative or a “fake” one is grounds for criminal prosecution. As before, none of the detainees took any actions as part of the plan. Detentions for participation in the initiative include individuals already serving sentences in open-type correctional facilities (“chemistry”).

Repressions continue against suspected administrators of opposition Telegram channels, with law enforcement interpreting their management as “creating an extremist formation.” It appears that during many arbitrary detentions of civil society representatives, law enforcement officers discover their connection with some group or organization disfavored by the authorities, and subsequently designate such a community as an “extremist formation” to formally justify prosecuting the individual. Since the “dzechat” initiative (a map showing the locations of most socio-political Belarusian chats) was declared an “extremist formation,” practically any chat is considered by the authorities as a “structural unit” of this “extremist formation.”

During the reporting period, human rights defenders recorded criminal cases against administrators of chats for Belarusians in Portugal and Madeira, Tarnogaj District in Wroclaw, Syarabryanka District in Minsk, Burdeyny Street in Minsk, Nieman Street in Minsk, the city of Kalisz in Poland, the United States, and a local Minsk chat that published information about the movements of security forces.

On July 12, 2024, it was reported that basketball referee Aliaksandr Syrytsa was detained for creating a basketball chat and for connections with the organization “Fund of Belarus Friend LTD,” which provides assistance to victims of repression and was therefore recognized as an “extremist formation.” Court proceedings also continued against members of the opposition chat “BChB-Trielit” – on August 28, 2024, a trial began against another member of the chat, Yanina Andreuk, whose sentence remains unknown. On September 18, 2024, a trial began against Babruysk resident Maksim Khvashchynski for creating the Telegram chats “Babruysk 375” and “Bobr 97%.”

Court proceedings have also begun against musician Uladzimir Naumovich, as well as parents of political prisoners: Mikhail Lapunou, father of political prisoner Mikita Zolatareu, for creating the chat “Homiel for Nikita Zolotareu,” and Tatsiana Frantskevich, mother of political prisoner Aliaksandr Frantskevich, who was detained along with her sister when they came to deliver a food parcel for Aliaksandr. Additionally, two sentences were issued against Yury Rukshta and Alyaksei Dalmatau on unknown charges.

In September 2024, it was reported that the State Security Committee (KGB) was conducting mass summonses and detentions of teachers from various regions of Belarus in connection with the nonprofit educational initiative “Adukavanka,” recognized as an “extremist formation.” Propaganda media described this initiative as a “subversive online education network.”

During the reporting period, this article was used against a religious organization. On August 22, 2024, GUBOPiK officers, with full support from OMON personnel in combat gear, detained 11 leaders and activists of the religious movement “Russian Orthodox Church – Tsar’s Empire,” referred to in state sources as an “international sect.” It was reported that criminal cases were initiated against five Belarusian activists of the movement under Articles 361-1 and the “non-extremist” Article 193 of the CC (“Organization and Leadership of a Religious Organization that Encroaches on the Personality, Rights, and Duties of Citizens”). According to the Investigative Committee (IC), the religious movement was managed by a “metropolitan” who gave instructions to prepare propaganda materials, write “prayers,” and oversee “preparations for publications for extremist online resources.” Human rights activist Leanid Sudalenka from HRC “Viasna” characterized the events around this movement as part of a pre-election crackdown on organizations not controlled by the state, and stated that those detained could be recognized as political prisoners if the charges are not changed.

This article continues to be used to prosecute activists in absentia. For example, on August 13, 2024, a special (in absentia) procedure was initiated against artist Vialeta Mayshuk.

Article 361-2 of the CC “Financing extremist activities”

Individuals who have made monetary or other material donations to solidarity funds, non-governmental, or opposition organizations recognized as “extremist formations” in Belarus are prosecuted under Article 361-2 of the CC (“financing extremist activities”). This article provides for up to 8 years in prison. Criminal prosecution also targets individuals who donated to funds long before they were recognized as “extremist.” According to HRC “Viasna,” at least 82 people have been convicted under Article 361-2 for donations from 2020 to August 23, 2024.

Between July and September 2024, at least four long-term sentences were issued for donations to pro-democratic organizations and funds:

  • In July 2024, the Vitebsk Regional Court sentenced political prisoner Zmitser Zaholavets for donations for the second time; he had previously been sentenced to 3.5 years in prison under several “extremist” articles of the CC. While the exact sentence is unknown, his prison term remained the same.
  • Also in July 2024, the Minsk City Court issued sentences to Anton Stankevich and Ilya Humbar.
  • On August 16, 2024, it became known that the Minsk City Court sentenced 55-year-old businessman Yiagor Volkau to 3 years in prison for a single donation.
  • On August 28, 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced Volha Kavalchuk.

The KGB and other government agencies continue to conduct mass “preventive conversations” with people who had sent money to solidarity funds. During these conversations, individuals are forced to sign a “voluntary surrender,” make a payment to one of the government accounts ten times bigger the amount of the alleged donation, and within ten days present a receipt of payment to the KGB. If the KGB’s demands are met, a document is typically issued to the individual stating that no criminal case will be initiated. Human rights defenders do not fully understand why some people are permitted to settle the matter with a “preventive conversation” and “restitution,” while others are immediately subjected to criminal prosecution. Pro-government resources frequently publish videos of individuals who “voluntarily surrendered” and “restituted damages”; human rights defenders recorded reports of such “preventive” measures against at least 12 people during the reporting period.

Despite the authorities’ adoption of “preventive measures,” human rights defenders continue to record regular detentions for donations. During the reporting period, at least three new cases of criminal prosecution were recorded, many of which involved IT specialists. For example:

  • On July 16, 2024, an IT specialist from Minsk was detained for a $15 donation to the BYSOL fund;
  • On August 2, 2024, an IT specialist was detained after returning from Lithuania to Belarus for four donations to “extremist formations”;
  • On September 27, 2024, a special (in absentia) procedure was initiated against Minsk resident Zmitser Zhlobau.

A trial also began against Orsha resident Aliaksandr Kamlenak.

Article 361-3 of the CC “Participation in an armed formation or armed Conflict on the territory of a foreign state, military operations, recruitment, or preparation of persons for such participation”

The reporting period was marked by continued repressions against individuals accused of connections with the Kalinouski Regiment and other Belarusian units within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Cases against potential volunteers and individuals maintaining connections with Regiment members are usually prosecuted under Part 1 of Article 361-3 of the CC, with a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison. Donations to Belarusian units are prosecuted under Part 2 of Article 361-3 of the CC, which provides for up to 10 years in prison.

The reporting period included cases likely targeting independent journalists, possibly for materials about the Regiment. On July 31, 2024, the Mahiliou Regional Court sentenced journalists Ales Sabaleuski and Yauhen Hlushkou to 4 and 3 years in prison, respectively. A criminal case was also initiated against journalist Zmitser Pankavets, who is abroad, for his connections with the Regiment.

Courts continue to issue sentences for material donations to the AFU and Belarusian units within it. Courts typically issue harsher sentences for financial support for Ukraine than for donations to Belarusian solidarity funds. During the reporting period, at least seven such sentences were reported on charges of “financing Belarusian citizens’ participation in armed formations on the territory of a foreign state.”

On July 17, 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced 38-year-old illustrator Natallya Levaya from Brest to 6 years in prison and fined her 40,000 rubles (about $12,200). According to the prosecution, she “transferred funds and cryptocurrency totaling 4,400 rubles (about $1,345) to bank accounts and virtual wallets of representatives of ‘extremist formations,’ including armed ones, such as the ‘Kalinouski Regiment,’ in 2021–2022.” It was reported that the sentence was issued despite her possession of a KGB document stating that she had already restituted the donations after a “preventive conversation.”

During the reporting period, sentences were likely issued for Homiel residents Leanid Kozyr, Nadzeya Karankevich, Zhanna Dashkevich, Mahiliou resident Vital Liaskavets, and Minsk residents Alina Khmeleuskaya and Mikhail Neznanau. Additionally, a trial began against IT specialist Maksim Remezau from the company “A1.” Two more detentions were reported, including a man detained for ten donations through PayPal to the Regiment and pro-democratic funds. Many cases also mention an earlier version of Article 361-2 of the CC, formerly titled “Financing the activities of an extremist formation,” suggesting that individuals are being prosecuted for donations made before June 19, 2021, long before most organizations were classified as “extremist formations.”

Article 361-4 of the CC “Aiding extremist activities”

This article continues to be used to prosecute any interaction with independent media and non-profit organizations recognized as “extremist materials” or “extremist formations.” The maximum penalty under this article is 7 years in prison.

During the reporting period, sentences in absentia continued to be issued against journalists and activists.

  • On August 2, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced journalist Ales Kirkievich in absentia to 7 years in prison, along with a large fine and confiscation of property for two interviews: one with the media outlet “Radio Svaboda” under the headline “Today’s Belarus Is the Least Favorable Time for Creating Belarusian Content” and another with the outlet “Belsat” titled “Moving Toward North Korea: Praising the Regime and Hunting for Spies. Belarusian Guides Discuss New Requirements.”
  • On July 24, 2024, Zmitser Karnienka, a member of the working group “Christian Vision,” reported that another criminal case was initiated against him, this time under Article 361-4 of the CC, for an interview with “Belsat.”
  • On August 19, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced activist sisters Nadzeya Stsiapantsova and Zhanna Zakharkevich in absentia to 5.5 and 5 years in prison, respectively, for “aiding extremist activities” under Article 361-4 of the CC.
  • On August 20, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced journalist and human rights defender Uladzimir Khilmanovich in absentia to 5 years in prison for “participation in an extremist formation” and “aiding extremist activities” under Articles 361-1 and 361-4 of the CC.
  • On August 31, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced BNF Party chairman Vadzim Saranchukou in absentia to 4 years in prison. 
  • Another trial in absentia was also reported for HRC “Viasna” human rights defender Alena Masliukova.

New cases in absentia under this article were also reported. For participation in two episodes of the television show “Plan:B” on “Belsat” TV, a criminal case was initiated against 12 individuals, including HRC “Viasna” human rights defender and journalist Siarhei Sys. It was reported that law enforcement has been conducting searches at the homes of participants’ relatives and pressuring them for several months. Later, it was reported that the criminal case was suspended for several individuals involved, as the searches and wanted notices yielded no results.

There are also reported criminal trials in person for individuals who gave interviews to independent media declared “extremist.” On September 13, 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced historian Ihar Melnikau to 4 years in prison for an interview with “Euroradio,” which was only recognized as an “extremist formation” five months after the interview. According to the prosecution, he “motivated by national and ideological enmity, knowingly aware of the extremist activities of participants in a banned Belarusian information resource, gave them an interview to promote the media and engage more citizens in such activities.”

In late August 2024, it was reported that a criminal trial had begun against Aleh Kisialyeu, an employee of the Viarkhnyadzvinsk district executive committee, under Articles 361-4 and 361-5 (“Undergoing training or other preparation for participation in extremist activities”) of the CC. According to law enforcement, he was a “student” of the New Belarus Cadre Reserve initiative, which was declared an “extremist formation.”

The reporting period saw a mass issuance of sentences for individuals supporting political prisoners and their relatives who were detained during KGB raids (at least 17 cases of prosecution in this regard have been reported):

  • On July 1, 2024, the Brest Regional Court began a case that resulted in sentencing Nadzeya Liaskavets to 3 years in prison;
  • On July 2, 2024, the same court sentenced Iryna Bandarenka to 3 years in prison for sending small monetary transfers to prisoners and delivering parcels to Detention Center-7 in Brest;
  • On July 8, 2024, the same court sentenced 55-year-old Iryna Pagadayeva from Brest to 3 years in prison for 32 money transfers to political prisoners and subscriptions to various human rights initiatives (such as HRC “Viasna” and “Disident.by”);
  • On August 6, 2024, it was reported that the Vitebsk Regional Court issued a sentence for Natallya Kremis;
  • On August 9, 2024, the same court sentenced 63-year-old pensioner Natallya Malets from Brest to 3.5 years in prison for regular money transfers to individuals held in detention on “extremist” charges. Her 125 transfers to those accused of “extremist crimes” and recognized as political prisoners by human rights defenders formed the basis of the charges. She was also accused of participating in the activities of the “Solidarity Letters Belarus 2020” initiative, recognized as an “extremist formation”; according to the prosecution, the initiative was aimed at “discrediting state authorities and inciting ideological hostility in Belarus;”
  • On August 9, 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced Natallya Kharitonava-Kryzhevich to 5 years of restricted freedom without placement in an open correctional facility (“home chemistry);
  • On August 14, 2024, the same court sentenced Iryna Tokarchuk, mother of former political prisoner Volha Tokarchuk, to 3 years in prison for receiving humanitarian food parcels from the INeedHelpBY initiative;
  • A sentence was also issued for Alesya Syarhienka, wife of former political prisoner Maksim Syarhienka, also for her connection with INeedHelpBY;
  • On September 3, 2024, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced Yuliya Krautsova to 4 years of restricted freedom without placement in an open correctional facility (“home chemistry”) for supporting political prisoners;
  • On September 12, 2024, the same court sentenced Maryna Hatsura to 5 years of restricted freedom without placement in an open correctional facility (“home chemistry”) for supporting political prisoners. The court also issued an unknown sentence for Inna Plakhatniuk and Yelena Totskaya due to their connection with the “Volunteers Homiel” chat group;
  • In September 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced Kseniya Susha to 3 years in prison;
  • On September 20, 2024, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced Aksana Liapko to 3 years in prison, and the same court sentenced Katsyaryna Mendryk to a similar sentence.

Court proceedings have also begun against individuals detained for sending parcels and monetary transfers to political prisoners: Iryna Klezovich, Alesya Dernakouskaya, Tatsiana Stepa, Natallya Varabei, Alena Taparkova, Maryna Aliseenka, Natallya Zhigar, Natallya Havron, Volha Lotsmanava, Natallya Davydka, Ala Dziasyatik. A criminal case was also initiated against Hanna Auchinnikova, who managed to escape Belarus, for two parcels she sent to political prisoners Zmitser Dashkevich and Svyataslau Udod.

Human rights defenders report numerous criminal cases under Article 361-4 of the CC, with details of the charges often unknown:

  • On July 25, 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced 63-year-old table tennis coach Yury Lahadziuk to 2 years in prison;
  • On August 27, 2024, human rights defenders learned of a sentence issued to Russian citizen Dzmitry Shletgauer under Article 361-4 of the CC and Article 358 (“espionage”);
  • Sentences were also issued for Artsiom Heniaralau, Hleb Dudko, and Anatol Kalinouski;
  • A trial began under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 361-4 against IT specialist Artur Memeh.

Human rights defenders continue to observe a decrease in cases of “aiding extremist activities” for sending media files of military and police movements to information resources. During the reporting period, two detentions related to this issue were recorded. On August 29, 2024, an IT specialist was detained for reporting the movement of two police cars, and on September 2, 2024, an insurance agent was detained for similar actions.

Article 369-1 of the CC “Discrediting the Republic of Belarus”

Publishing any information contradicting the official position of the authorities is classified by state agencies as “knowingly false” and is subject to criminal prosecution. This article continues to be used to repress activists who impartially cover the socio-political situation in Belarus. The maximum penalty under this article is 4 years in prison.

On July 18, 2024, the Maladzyechna District Court sentenced former political prisoner and Vileyka activist Andrei Kudzik to 4 years in prison for “discrediting the Republic of Belarus” under Article 369-1 of the CC, allegedly for his critical TikTok videos. In July 2024, the Brest Regional Court also issued a sentence against Zmitser Savenka.

During the reporting period, the Vitebsk Regional Court began an in absentia trial against Polatsk businessman Uladzimir Zakharau. Charges were also reported against former political prisoner Stanislau Taspaeu and pro-government blogger-provocateur Yauhen Katliarou, known for spreading fakes in the media and later “debunking” them.

Administrative offense cases

This section analyzes publicly available information on the practice of applying the “extremist” articles of the Administrative Code (CoAO), namely Articles 19.10 and 19.11.

Article 19.10 of the CoAO “Promotion or public display, manufacture, distribution of Nazi symbols or attributes”

Due to the inaccessibility of the Court Decisions Database, Human Constanta human rights defenders do not know the exact number of cases under this article during the reporting period. Based on public sources, our legal team is aware of at least 29 cases of prosecution under this article.

Detentions for specific tattoos continued (a total of 6 such cases). After serving administrative detention, law enforcement requires detainees to modify the tattoo immediately and report back to the police department. In many “confessional” videos, detainees are also forced to apologize to Belarusian WWII veterans. For example, on July 10, 2024, authorities reported the detention of a resident of the Homiel region who, while previously in prison, had tattooed Nazi symbols (a swastika on his neck and a portrait of Hitler) as a way of expressing his unwillingness to cooperate with the prison administration.

Repressions also affect tattoo artists who, according to law enforcement, may have created Nazi tattoos. On July 11, 2024, tattoo artist Dzianis Harbachou from Mahiliou was detained; authorities allege that he not only gave others tattoos with Nazi symbols but also had a similar tattoo himself (an eagle with a swastika on his leg). On July 27, 2024, authorities detained a Hrodna resident for having a “Black Sun” tattoo and photos featuring a Nazi salute on social media; later, another Belarusian was detained for a similar tattoo and distributing a photo of Hitler. Similar detentions were reported for a resident of Brest, a resident of Barysau, a resident of Vitebsk, and one more Belarusian.

Authorities continued to detain people for posting content with banned symbols on social networks and messengers. On July 13, 2024, two Hrodna residents were detained for participating in a closed Telegram group where they shared images of swastikas and photos with Nazi salutes. On August 24, 2024, authorities detained a student from Homiel whose Telegram nickname contained the numbers “1488,” which are coded symbols of racial hatred and Nazi propaganda. The student was unaware of the meaning of these numbers, and GUBOPiK officers conducted a conversation with him about neo-Nazism and the responsibilities under Articles 19.10 and 19.11 of the CoAO. On September 24, 2024, a Hrodna resident was detained for publishing photos of Nazi salutes in public places.

Cases were documented for possession of various historical Nazi artifacts. On August 12, 2024, authorities reported the detention of a resident of Pinsk who had been excavating WWII-era Nazi artifacts, storing them at home, and selling some of them, leading to his arrest.

Symbols associated with Ukraine are often labeled “neo-Nazi.” A man was detained for displaying the national flag of Ukraine and the Right Sector movement flag in his car.

More complex cases under this article were also reported. On July 8, 2024, pro-government sources reported the detention of 56 people at an unauthorized rock concert near Pinsk. Video footage shows OMON officers in full gear storming the campsite, pulling people from tents. Authorities claim they “dispersed a gathering of neo-pagans, Nazis, and informal Satanists.” Later, 11 participants were administratively prosecuted under Articles 19.10 and 19.11 of the CoAO.

On August 29, 2024, the pro-government media outlet “SB. Belarus Today” reported the detention of “four adherents of Nazi symbols.” In the city of Lyuban, Minsk region, law enforcement noticed a swastika tattoo on the hand of an 18-year-old local resident and then found a video on his phone of his 18-year-old friend making a Nazi salute near a WWII monument – he was also detained. During further investigation, police identified a 17-year-old acquaintance of the detainee who also had a swastika tattoo and kept a T-shirt with an SS emblem at home. Subsequently, authorities discovered a 40-year-old local entrepreneur who had embroidered a banned symbol on fabric based on a sketch by the detained girl. All four individuals were administratively prosecuted under Article 19.10 of the CoAO, and a criminal case for “hooliganism” was initiated against the two 18-year-old Belarusians under Article 339 of the CC.

Article 19.11 of the CoAO “Distribution, manufacture, storage, transportation of information products containing calls for or propagating extremist activities”

Due to the inaccessibility of the Court Decisions Database, Human Constanta human rights defenders do not know the exact number of cases under this article during the reporting period. Based on public sources, our legal team is aware of at least 106 cases of prosecution under this article. Although human rights defenders report fewer cases under Article 19.11 of the CoAO in public sources, it is likely that detentions and trials are occurring at a higher rate than recorded, based on previous periods when such cases numbered in the hundreds or even thousands. In September 2024, journalist Ruslan Kulevich stated that over 250 people were convicted for subscribing to his social media accounts in the Lenin District of Hrodna alone.

Since virtually all independent media and opposition resources are recognized as “extremist materials,” disseminating any information unfavorable to the authorities can be considered a violation. The vast majority of people are punished under this article for reposting “banned” information on their social media pages. In addition to reposts, sending “banned” links in private messages is also considered a violation.

The practice of prosecuting individuals who subscribe to resources recognized as “extremist materials” or “extremist formations” continues. Human rights defenders suggest that such cases have recently become more common than those involving direct “distribution.” For example, a resident of Vitebsk was detained for subscribing to independent media accounts, including “Nasha Niva,” “Belarus. All About Everything,” and “Belsat” on Odnoklassniki, while a resident of Homiel was detained for subscribing to the satirical public group “Chai z Malinavym Varenniam” on VKontakte.

Most people are prosecuted for reposts made before the content was declared “extremist.” Such violations are deemed “ongoing,” so under Article 4.6 of the CoAO, the standard two-month statute of limitations from the day of the violation does not apply – instead, the limitation period is two months from the discovery of the offense.

Law enforcement continues the practice of documenting each repost as a separate violation, allowing courts to impose 15-day detentions almost indefinitely. On September 10, 2024, it was reported that the deputy director of a legal consulting company was threatened with a lengthy detention for six “extremist” reposts.

Mass detentions in regional cities for actions with “extremist materials” continued, followed by “conveyor court” processes:

  • On July 10, 2024, at least two employees of the Mozyr Oil Refinery were detained: plant specialist Valery Boisha and editor of the plant newspaper Sviatlana Bohush. Later, it was reported that the head of the department, Liliya Dragel, was also detained;
  • On July 23, 2024, at least five residents of Navapolatsk were detained; each case was reviewed in just 15 to 30 minutes by the local judge;
  • On July 30, 2024, at least five employees of the Senno Central District Hospital were detained. The chief doctor stated that the detainees had long been subscribed to “extremist” channels and had not unsubscribed over time. Later, another hospital employee and a paramedic from the local ambulance service were convicted of “extremist distribution;”
  • On August 5, 2024, at least five residents of Mozyr were detained for subscribing to “extremist” channels; during the detentions, law enforcement broke into homes and apartments;
  • On August 7, 2024, at least eight employees of a local industrial enterprise in Smarhon were detained;
  • From August 12 to 24, at least six people in Astravets were convicted for subscribing to “extremist” Telegram channels;
  • On August 24, 2024, at least six soldiers from Military Unit 71327 in Zaslonava, Lepiel District, were detained;
  • On September 2, 2024, court hearings were held for eight residents of the Vitebsk region;
  • On September 18, 2024, at least seven residents of the Homiel region were detained with the support of four different special units. It was reported that “some were detained and ended up in detention, while others were simply warned and remained free;”
  • From September 19-20, 2024, at least four employees of a “Beltelecom” branch in Ushachy were convicted;
  • On September 19, 2024, at least five people in Stolin were detained;
  • On September 27, 2024, at least 10 residents of the Homiel region were detained, in particular in Brahin, Yelsk, Loyeu, Khoiniki, and Naraulia.

During the reporting period, mass detentions of owners of catering establishments in the Hrodna region were recorded. The owner of the Lida restaurant “Vashi Guli,” the owner of the Lida coffee shop “Tutaka,” the owner of the “Stole” bar in Byarozauka, and several of her employees were detained. Former political prisoners, Catholic priests, doctors, teachers in state institutions, and popular bloggers are also traditional targets of persecution under this article. Court proceedings regularly target parents with multiple children and people with disabilities.

Arbitrary detentions under this article continue to affect not only opposition figures but also pro-government and pro-Russian activists. On August 29, 2024, controversial pro-Russian activist Elvira Mirsalimova reported the detention of pro-Russian activist Artsiom Agafonau. Agafonau also reported that another pro-Russian activist from Vitebsk, Aliaksandr Andreiukou, was awaiting trial for “extremist materials.” On September 11, 2024, the Dobrush District Court reviewed an administrative case against pro-government trade union representative Mikalai Toleyka.

Detentions continued for individuals with tattoos featuring abbreviations deemed “extremist materials,” primarily “A.C.A.B.” (indicating a negative view toward police) – at least six detentions were recorded in this regard: two football fans from Salihorsk and Hrodna, a Minsk resident, two Vitebsk residents, and a resident of Zhabinka. Some detainees were given 24 hours to cover the tattoo and avoid a 15-day detention, paying only a fine. However, for unknown reasons, some detainees are not offered this option; these detainees appear in “confessional” videos where they promise under duress to remove the tattoo after serving their administrative detention. A case was reported of a Belarusian who felt unwell and sought help from police officers, who, after taking him to the hospital, discovered a banned tattoo on his body and demanded its removal. A Vitebsk resident was detained for an anti-war tattoo “F*** the War” following a report from visitors at the “Slavic Bazaar” music festival – law enforcement interpreted it as a “slogan from extremist sources.” OMON units of up to eight officers, who pointed firearms at detainees only for administrative offenses.

Detentions were also reported for wearing clothing with the aforementioned abbreviation – a Belarusian was detained for wearing a T-shirt and cap with “A.C.A.B.” On September 16, 2024, it was reported that a Minsk resident was detained for wearing clothing displaying the number “1312,” a numeric code equivalent to “A.C.A.B.”

During the reporting period, human rights defenders recorded the practice of using forced labor for detainees convicted of “distributing extremist materials.” Pro-government Telegram channels reported the detention of two Rechytsa residents, Vyacheslau Sadchanka and Danila Kuzniatsou, and claimed they were sent to a local agricultural enterprise to assist in cleaning up storm damage in the Homiel region. These measures appear to be a personal initiative of the police rather than a court-mandated punishment of community service. It was reported that law enforcement “gave them a chance to make amends without going to jail,” although the detainees failed to appear for work, leading to a threat of arrest.

Changes to the Republican list of extremist materials

From July to September 2024, the Republican list of extremist materials (hereinafter referred to as the list) on the Ministry of Information website included information on 334 new court decisions recognizing materials as “extremist” (compared to 354 in the previous period). A total of 598 informational materials were banned (compared to 557 in the previous three months), including 95 Telegram resources. As of September 30, 2024, the list contained 6,414 materials, including 1,124 Telegram resources. During the reporting period, the courts primarily focused on accounts in the social network “X” and smaller TikTok accounts. There was also an increase in the number of personal social media pages of politicians, human rights defenders, activists, and political prisoners added to the list.

Prosecutor’s offices in several regions continue to report statistics on the recognition of products as “extremist.” For example, the Brest prosecutor’s office reported that “from January to August 2024, as part of efforts to counter the spread of information on internet resources aimed at increasing social tensions in society and creating distrust toward government representatives, it submitted 215 applications to the courts to recognize informational products from destructive internet resources as extremist materials.” The Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office submitted 103 similar applications over the same period.

From July to September 2024, materials continued to be recognized as “extremist,” including:

  • Resources of independent Belarusian media: Threads pages, Viber, Dzen, and LiveJournal accounts for the “This is Minsk, Baby” project; websites “Reform.News” and “orsha.eu”; Telegram channels “Homielskaya Prauda” and “Belaruskaya Prauda”; the “Belsat” Facebook group; the “Media-Polesie” YouTube channel; the Instagram accounts of “ex.press.online” and “Baranavichy News”; the TikTok account for the talk show “Para!”; the “BGmedia” Telegram channel; and the VKontakte group “Homiel Online”;
  • Resources of independent Russian media: the film by the publication “Redaktsiya” titled “How the Ruler of Belarus Remains Unsinkable for 30 Years”; the Telegram channel of DOXA; the Russian human rights media project Avtozak LIVE;
  • Resources of Ukrainian media and Ukrainian Telegram channels: “X” accounts of publications “DW українською” and “Voice of America Ukrainian”; the social media accounts of “Telegraf”; the YouTube channel “UNIAN”; Telegram channels “Ukraine Online: News | Politics,” “Real Kyiv | Ukraine,” “STERNENKO,” “PETLYARIS,” “+ Vertical,” and “Pandora’s Box” – according to the prosecutor’s office, several of these channels “posted information inciting political and national enmity toward Belarus and Russia, the Belarusian and Russian people, and included publications insulting the head of state”;
  • Accounts of units and fighters opposing Russian aggression: the Instagram account of the civil sector of the “Pahonia” squad; the TikTok account “bel.warriors”; the Instagram account of the 1st separate air assault company of the Belarusian volunteer unit; Telegram channels of veteran Kalinouski Regiment member Ivan Tamashevich, “Volna-Kazachiy Detachment RDK” and “UAV RDK,” “Thule Signal / Alexei Lyovkin / Molotok from RDK”;
  • Individual publications from media outlets previously recognized as “extremist”: articles by the publication “Charter97” titled “Natallya Radzina: The War May Have Unexpected Consequences for Lukashenka” and others; articles from MediaIQ, such as “From ‘We Can Protect’ to ‘We Can Repeat’ – Just One Step. How the Militarist Narrative in Belarus Has Changed” and others; YouTube videos from “Radio Svaboda” titled “Belarusians Are Losing Their Property” and others;
  • Accounts of active Belarusians: the Facebook page of the “Cyber Partisan” activist Yuliana Shametavets; Instagram accounts of sports activist Aliaksandra Herasimenya, volleyball player Artur Udrys, basketball player Alena Leuchanka, youth activist Margaryta Vorykhava, activist Dzianis Chaschavik, and “BYSOL” head Andrei Stryzhak; “X” accounts of human rights defenders Viktoryia Fiodarava and Siarhei Ustinau;
  • Personal pages of political prisoners: the Instagram account of Vladyslau Savin; the Odnoklassniki page of Mikhail Chemuraka; the social media accounts of the “Association of Political Prisoners of Belarus”;
  • Resources of opposition movements: the LiveJournal blog “For Your City” belonging to the Brest branch of the “Hramada” party; the Odnoklassniki page of the “Young Front” organization; TikTok accounts of the “Latushka and the Movement for Freedom” and “European Choice” movements; the Telegram channel of the “OSINT Phoenix” project; the Facebook group “United Civic Party – OGP”; the Instagram account of the “Belarusian Sports Forum”; the Instagram account of ultras fans “Dynama Minsk”; and the TikTok account of the Belarusian Investigative Center;
  • Resources with consultations for conscripts: the social media accounts of “Military Assistance Service Voennik.by” and “Povestka.pro”;
  • Resources of opposition politicians: “X” accounts of politicians Pavel Latushka, Valery Kavaleuski, Valery Tsapkala; the Instagram account of Vadzim Prakopieu; VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, “X,” and Instagram accounts of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s advisor Franak Viachorka;
  • Resources of political analysts: “X” accounts of analysts Pavel Slyunkin and Artsiom Shraibman;
  • Independent informational resources and blogs: social media of the blog “People’s Reporter”; the YouTube channels “Belarus beyond the MKAD” and “Maxim Shabutski”; the TikTok channel “Belarus Golovnogo Mozga 2.0”; the Telegram channel “The Black Book of Belarus”; the TikTok accounts “belaruskawolnaya” and “scorpion1808059” among many others; the VKontakte group “Country for Life”; and the “X” page titled “Elis Angry Because of the War”;
  • Previously overlooked local chats and accounts: Telegram chats for various districts of Minsk, including Chyzhouka, Liebiadziny, Shabany, Zalataya Gorka, the Spartynaya metro station area, Akhotskaya Street, and Baikal Street; the “Minsk Autazak Control” account; the Instagram account for the Vesnyanka district; the city of Slutsk; the Telegram channel for the city of Luninyets; VKontakte pages titled “Minsk Online” and “Lida – Our City”; Odnoklassniki pages titled “Our Vileika” and “MikashevichiRB”; and the Facebook group “For Our City Pruzhany”;
  • Social media accounts of Belarusian diasporas around the world: Facebook groups of Belarusians in Bialystok, the Belarusian hub in Bialystok, Warsaw, Germany, and Ukraine, as well as the group “Actions of Belarusians in Warsaw”; an Odnoklassniki group titled “People’s Embassy of Belarus in Lithuania”; “X” accounts for Belarusians in the United Kingdom, the “People’s Embassy of Belarus in Sweden,” and the “People’s Embassy of Belarus in Slovenia”; Instagram accounts of Belarusians in Gdańsk, Bordeaux, Seattle, and Finland;
  • Resources from human rights and other non-governmental organizations: the Facebook page of the organization “Our House,” which assists Belarusians in Lithuania; the website of the International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus; a series of investigations into torture in the district police departments and temporary detention centers; the TikTok account of the organization “Legal Initiative”; the website and social media of the Office for European Expertise and Communications; the website and Facebook group of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee; Telegram channels of the volunteer group “DAR Initiative” and the “One Window. Assistance to Belarusians” project; “X” accounts of the German-Swiss human rights organization “Libereco” and the initiative “Volnyya Pashtoŭki”; the Instagram account “INeedHelpBY”;
  • Resources associated with Belarusian culture: the YouTube channel of the cultural and educational portal “Budzma Belarusians!”; the YouTube channel of the musical group “Dai Darohu!”; a YouTube video featuring a poem by Belarusian poet Aliaksandr Bal titled “My Homeland in Distress”; the Instagram account of artist Uladzimir Tsesler; and social media for the project “About Culture” on understanding and enjoying culture;
  • Satirical resources: the TikTok channel “beldurdom” and the Instagram account “BelMems”;
  • Educational initiatives: social media of the project “Sprava Vybaru”;
  • Anarchist initiatives: “X” and YouTube accounts of the organization “Anarchist Black Cross Belarus.”

The period was marked by yet another round of absurd additions to the list. During the reporting period, courts labeled products as “extremist” that had no connection to socio-political issues or actual extremism. The following were recognized as “extremist”:

  • The YouTube channel “Dr. Bitterlich,” where a doctor discusses nervous system issues;
  • The religious Telegram channel “Katolik.life” about Catholic news in Belarus and worldwide – likely due to its publications on the arrests of priests and the concerns of believers about the war;
  • Belarusian Wikipedia fan communities on VKontakte and Telegram, where the most popular articles in Belarusian were published;
  • The website “agrolivе.by,” an agricultural journalist’s site about Belarusian agriculture realities, likely recognized as “extremist” due to reposts from “extremist” informational resources;
  • The Instagram account “childfree_myway” – law enforcement continues to consider the childfree ideology “extremism.”

From July to September 2024, four new books were added to the list, most of which were written by political prisoner and historian Ihar Melnikau:

  • The book “Adysseya Paleshuka” (2017) by Ihar Melnikau, featuring memoirs by Pavel Nichiporuk, a Belarusian soldier of the Second Polish Corps, recounting his experiences during World War II, along with the author’s essays on various aspects of Belarusian history;
  • The book “Forgotten Corps: The History of the Polish Army in Babruysk in 1918, 1919-1920” (2018) by Ihar Melnikau, detailing the Belarusian People’s Republic, the formation of the First Polish Corps, and other events in Belarusian life during the interwar period;
  • The book “On the ‘Edge of Civilizations’. Pages of the History of the Pre-War Soviet-Polish Border in Belarus” (2020) by Ihar Melnikau, covering various aspects of the Soviet-Polish border’s operation during the interwar period;
  • The e-book “All-Belarusian Civil Revolutionary Operation ‘Bagration’ on August 9, 2020, or the Final Solution to the Fascist Question. Practical Instructions” by activist Maksim Shabutski, which contains instructions for resisting Belarusian authorities.

The period also saw the inclusion of several isolated neo-Nazi resources: Telegram channels “WHITE LIVES MATTER,” “NSDAP Archive,” “Skinheads Are Our Salvation. I.R.S.,” “Reich’s Children,” “Aryan Way | Ariysky Shlyakh,” “Aryan Orgy,” “Zalizna Sich,” “Temple of Gothard,” as well as a clothing brand “Supcable” featuring a black eagle with outstretched wings, and the video “Diaries of 1945. The Last Entries of Joseph Goebbels (Audiobook).”

During the reporting period, two court rulings that recognized materials as “extremist” were overturned: on August 13, 2024, the Brest Regional Court overturned its decision to declare the pro-Russian Telegram channel “Daily Storm” as “extremist.” Additionally, for unknown reasons, in late June, the Leninsky District Court in Mahiliou overturned its decision to declare seven TikTok accounts and three Telegram channels with socio-political content as “extremist.”

For detailed information on this list, see our material.

Changes in the List of organizations, formations, and individual entrepreneurs involved in extremist activities

As of October 1, 2024, the List of Organizations, Formations, and Individual Entrepreneurs Involved in Extremist Activities includes 238 formations recognized as such by the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the KGB, along with 2 organizations deemed “extremist” by court decisions. Over the past three months, 17 new “extremist formations” were added to the list. Some additions were accompanied by criminal cases against the corresponding groups. Authorities are increasingly listing personal information of individuals identified as members or leaders of these “formations.” Creating, leading, or participating in an “extremist formation” carries a criminal penalty of up to 7 years in prison under Article 361-1 of the CC.

By the end of September 2024, the list included 26 regional media outlets and national online resources. During the reporting period, the regional media “Orsha.eu” was designated an “extremist formation.” This period also saw a wave of non-governmental organizations being designated as “extremist formations,” including the “Belarusian National Youth Council ‘RADA,’” educational initiatives “School of Leadership” and “Adukavanka,” the “Belarusian Women’s Fund,” the initiative to implement a program for associations and organizations developing civil society “OEEC,” the “Association of Political Prisoners of Belarus,” and the Polish foundation “Freedom and Democracy.”

Also list the political organization “National Democratic Platform,” which focuses on restoring the agency of pro-democratic forces in exile, as well as the information resource “Pahonia Hrodna” and the civil association “Pahonia,” established to support volunteers fighting against Russian aggression in Ukraine, were added to the list. Small opposition Telegram chats like “Zhive!,” “Mikhalovo Chat,” “Medics of Hrodna,” “ShapitoDoch,” and “Propovednik” were also added.

One unusual addition to the list was the international sect “Russian Orthodox Church – Tsar’s Empire,” discussed in more detail in the section on Article 361-1 of the CC.

For detailed information on this list, see our material.

Changes in the List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens, or stateless persons involved in extremist activities

The List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens, or stateless persons involved in extremist activities was first published on March 23, 2022, and has since been actively expanded with hundreds of people whose convictions under “extremist” articles have come into legal force. As of October 1, 2024, the list includes 4,477 individuals, with 301 people added over the last three months, while 14 individuals were removed from the list during this period.

During the reporting period, foreign citizens were added to the list: Ukrainian citizen Yury Bandarenka, convicted for comments critical of Lukashenka; Russian citizen Alexey Kulikov, convicted in the “case of sabotage preparation in Hrodna”; and German citizen Rico Krieger, initially sentenced to death for sabotage preparations and later pardoned and transferred to Germany.

The reporting period saw the most additions of individuals convicted under the following articles of the CC:

  • Article 342 of the CC “Participation in Actions Grossly Violating Public Order” – 172 people;
  • Article 130 of the CC “Incitement of enmity” – 52 people;
  • Article 368 of the CC “Insulting Lukashenka” – 37 people;
  • Article 361-4 of the CC “Aiding extremist activities” – 29 people;
  • Article 361-2 of the CC “Financing extremist activities” – 28 people;
  • Article 369 of the CC “Insulting a government official” – 25 people;
  • Article 361-1 of the CC “Participation in an extremist formation” – 22 people.

During the reporting period, the list was particularly actively expanded with activists convicted in absentia. Notable additions include bloggers Andrei and Volha Pavuk; activists Maryja Lyauchuk and Illa Salyankou; journalist and human rights defender Uladzislau Khilmanovich; and former director of the “Belarusian Rada of Culture,” Aliaksandr Chakhauski. Individuals convicted for supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, such as Ihar Charnavusau, are also regularly added to the list. Entire families are frequently included, such as the Prokharaus family, whose members were convicted for photographing various sites in Belarus for Ukrainian intelligence services.

For detailed information on this list, see our material.

Changes in the List of organizations and individuals involved in terrorist activities

The grounds for inclusion in the terrorist list are similar to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens, or stateless persons involved in extremist activities,” although one can be placed on this list based solely on accusations without a court decision.

As of October 3, 2024, the list includes 1,170 individuals, among them 480 Belarusian citizens, as well as two Ukrainian citizens, one Russian citizen, and one German citizen, all added due to their civic stance. Over the past three months, the list grew by 38 individuals, including 36 Belarusian citizens. Individuals on this list are effectively barred from engaging in any financial transactions. Updates to the list often reveal the names of political prisoners previously unknown to human rights defenders.

In addition to Belarusians, two Haitian citizens were added to the list based on the UN Security Council sanctions lists: Profane Victor, a former Haitian parliamentarian involved in arms trafficking and political violence, and Luxon Elan, the leader of the Haitian gang “Gran Grif.” Alongside individuals whose actions could pose a genuine threat to national security, Belarusian authorities include representatives of the Belarusian opposition and civil society in the list. The vast majority of individuals added under the above-mentioned articles are accused of activities unrelated to actual terrorism. Only four Belarusians were included in the List based on a conviction for “financing terrorist activities” under Article 290-1 of the CC (likely due to donations to opposition organizations), while the others were added under accusations or convictions for online comments under Articles 130 of the CC (“Incitement of enmity,” 27 people) and 361 of the CC (“Calls for harm to national security,” 14 people), or for participation in peaceful protests under Article 293 of the CC (“Mass riots,” 3 people). The list is also regularly expanded with activists convicted in absentia, including during this reporting period, with the addition of politician Franak Viachorka.

For the first time in a long while, a new Belarusian organization was added to the list. On October 30, 2024, the Supreme Court, at the request of the Prosecutor General, recognized the “Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment” as a “terrorist organization” along with its structural subdivisions, including the “Volat Battalion,” “Litvin Battalion,” “Western Battalion,” “Mikita Kryutsou UAV,” “ATOM Detachment,” “Tango-Romeo,” the “Mobilization Center of the Belarusian House in Warsaw” fund, and the “Kalinoŭtsy Movement.” Notably, such court decisions come into immediate effect and are not subject to appeal. It is now likely that individuals associated with the Regiment or who have sent material donations to the organization will face persecution not only under “extremist” articles of the CC but also “terrorist” articles, which carry harsher penalties.

For detailed information on this list, see our material.

Restriction of access to Internet resources

As of September 1, 2024, the Ministry of Information has made decisions to restrict access to nearly 14,000 internet resources, over 5,000 of which were recognized as “extremist materials” and/or “extremist formations.” In 2023, the Ministry of Information restricted access to 3,388 resources, many of which are opposition portals or independent media that authorities label as “propagandist destructive extremist resources.” For comparison, only 400 internet resources were restricted from 2015 to 2020, indicating that mass blocking began following the suppression of large-scale protests in 2020 as a tool to curb criticism of the authorities. During the reporting period, the following sites were blocked on “extremist” grounds:

  • The site “tribunal.info,” created “to express the opinion of the Belarusian people on human rights and freedoms violations in the country.” According to the prosecutor’s office, “the portal contained materials showing signs of extremism aimed at inciting social enmity or discord, discrediting the head of state, government bodies, and law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus, as well as calls for organizing and preparing actions that grossly violate public order and for participation in such actions.” On nearly identical grounds, the “Belarusian Railway Workers’ Community” website was also blocked;
  • The site “apbel.com,” belonging to the “Association of Political Prisoners of Belarus.” According to the prosecutor’s office, “the portal contained informational materials showing signs of extremism aimed at discrediting government bodies. The actions of individuals who committed offenses and crimes were wrongfully legitimized, and they were given the false status of ‘political prisoners’”;
  • The site “povestka.pro,” which provides consultations for conscripts. According to the prosecutor’s office, “the portal published information promoting methods of evading military service obligations, which contradicted the national interests of the state”;
  • The site “Katolik.life,” covering news about Catholics in Belarus and worldwide, was blocked after being designated “extremist materials.”

Belarusian prosecutors are also actively working to block “extremist” resources on Russian streaming services. For example, at the request of the Homiel District Prosecutor’s Office, songs by the band Tor Band and content from the publication “Malanka Media” were removed from “Yandex Music.”

For more information on the procedure for restricting access to internet resources in Belarus, please see our material.

Propaganda efforts in the fight against “extremism”

Authorities continue propaganda efforts about the dangers of “extremism” in Belarus, stressing the unacceptability of committing “extremist” crimes and offenses. Thematic meetings and “dialogue platforms” are used by authorities to intimidate the public, primarily targeting state enterprise employees and young students, as well as to promote a propagandist political ideology and foster hostility toward democratic countries and opposition figures.

On July 2, 2024, at Francysk Skaryna Homiel State University, a “dialogue platform on the topic of extremism prevention among youth” was held with the participation of the Deputy Prosecutor of the Homiel Region, Yury Bulynka. During the meeting, he stated that “the victims of subversive work by unfriendly states are the still-developing minds of adolescents.”

On August 15, 2024, the “Unified Information Day” (a regular event where ideologists, representatives of the executive branch, and prosecutors meet with the public at state enterprises) was held at the Pinsk Bus Depot. During this event, prosecutor’s office representative Katsiaryna Babich spoke to employees about the Republican list of extremist materials, stating, “If before I always said: read, review the list – now I say: it’s best to unsubscribe from anything you don’t need.” In this way, even prosecutor’s office employees acknowledge the impracticality of tracking updates to a list with thousands of entries, recommending instead that people broadly unsubscribe from any non-state resources to avoid becoming targets of arbitrary detentions.

On September 12, 2024, during a meeting of the Astravets District Executive Committee, it was reported that “almost every week, citizens in the district are identified as being subscribed to extremist channels,” and recommendations were given on how to monitor changes in the relevant list.

Additionally, prosecutors regularly conduct “dialogue platforms” at educational institutions and enterprises on the topic of “investigating the criminal case of the genocide of the Belarusian people.” Thematic exhibitions are opened in schools and even correctional facilities. At these meetings, the “harmful legal consequences of distributing extremist materials” are also mentioned.

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