Equating any dissent with “extremism” or “terrorism” remains one of the most widespread repressive tactics in Belarus. The unprecedentedly broad application of “anti-extremism” legislation, which has been systematic since 2020, has effectively turned political persecution into a “conveyer,” which is facilitated by an entire “ecosystem” of repression – specialized laws on combating “extremism” and “terrorism”; corresponding criminal and administrative offenses; numerous “extremist” lists; amendments enabling the revocation of citizenship for “extremist crimes” or the imposition of the death penalty for “acts of terrorism” and “high treason.”

The politicized nature of this legislation has been repeatedly criticized at the international level. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus has emphasized that the adoption and implementation of “anti-extremism legislation” in Belarus “is part of a state-directed, widespread and systematic policy for eradicating civic space and any actual or perceived dissent in the country.” The report of the OHCHR Examination of the human rights situation in Belarus also highlights the use of “broad counter-terrorism and counter-extremism legislation to restrict civic space.”

Over the past year, prosecution for “extremism” has often taken absurd forms, where songs, memes, and anime icons were deemed as manifestations of extremism. However, the consequences of such repression are far from humorous – Belarusian courts have repeatedly issued harsh sentences for donations, online comments, and acts of direct action. The fight against “extremism” also has an external dimension. In 2024, Belarus joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – an entity where counter-extremism efforts are defined in an overly broad manner, blurring the lines between violent and non-violent extremism and justifiably drawing international criticism.

For the past four years, we have been preparing regular reports on how Belarusian authorities conduct their “fight against extremism.” Below, we present key numbers and trends in politically motivated “anti-extremism” persecution in 2024.

“Extremism” in numbers

According to the Investigative Committee (IC), since 2020, a total of 22,500 “extremist crimes” have been documented. In 2024 alone, special (in absentia) criminal proceedings were officially initiated against 109 individuals residing abroad. However, public sources indicate that criminal cases have been opened against more than 350 people living outside Belarus.

In 2024, HRC “Viasna” documented 1,721 convictions under “extremist” criminal articles, while Dissident.by documented 1,762 convictions. The most commonly used Criminal Code (CC) provisions for persecution were:

• Article 342 CC – Organizing and preparing actions that grossly violate public order, or actively participating in them: 1,019 convictions
• Article 368 CC – Insulting the President of the Republic of Belarus: 245 convictions
• Article 130 CC – Incitement to racial, national, religious, or other social hatred or discord: 186 convictions
• Article 369 CC – Insulting a government official: 135 convictions
• Article 361-4 CC – Aiding extremist activity: 109 convictions
• Article 361-1 CC – Creating an extremist formation or participating in it: 102 convictions
• Article 361 CC – Calls for restrictive measures (sanctions) or other actions aimed at harming the national security of Belarus: 79 convictions
• Article 357 CC – Conspiracy or other actions committed to seize state power: 60 convictions
• Article 361-2 CC – Financing extremist activities: 60 convictions
• Article 356 CC – High treason: 45 convictions

According to the press service of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, in 2024, he granted clemency to 293 individuals convicted of “extremist crimes.” This figure significantly exceeds the numbers officially published in state sources, which publicly acknowledge only 227 pardons in the past year. However, pardons applied to only a small fraction of the total number of arbitrarily detained and unjustly convicted individuals. As shown in the data above, more people were convicted during the reporting period than were released. Moreover, it appears that those granted clemency retain their criminal records.

In 2024, at least five individuals died due to politically motivated persecution under “extremist” charges:

• On the night of 8–9 January 2024, Vadzim Khrasko died in a Vitebsk hospital after being denied medical care in a penal colony. He had been convicted of “financing extremist activities.”
• On 20 February 2024, Ihar Lednik died in a prison hospital in Kolyadychi due to a lack of medical assistance. He had been sentenced for “defamation against Lukashenka.”
• On 9 April 2024, Aliaksandr Kulinich died in Brest pretrial detention due to worsening heart conditions. He had been accused of “insulting Lukashenka.”
• On 11 October 2024, Dzmitry Shlethauer, a Russian citizen, died of “mechanical asphyxiation” in Mahiliou Penal Colony. He had been convicted of “agent activity” and “aiding extremist activity.”
• On 10 December 2024, Sviatlana Krutikava, a resident of the Pinsk district, committed suicide due to ongoing harassment and persecution under “extremist” charges.

In Belarus, “extremism” serves as grounds for prosecution not only under criminal law but also under administrative law. According to Dissident.by, between 2020 and 2024, at least 21,692 individuals were convicted under “extremist” articles of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO). Data from HRC “Viasna” indicates that in 2024 alone, at least 5,890 individuals were convicted under administrative “extremist” charges.

The following figures illustrate the scale of repression under four key “extremist” articles of the CAO:

• Article 19.10 CAO – Propaganda of Nazi symbols: 313 convictions in 2024
• Article 19.11 CAO – Distribution, production, storage, or transportation of extremist materials: at least 8,075 convictions between 2020 and 2024; 2,600 to 5,500 convictions in 2024 alone
• Article 24.15 CAO – Use of foreign gratuitous aid for terrorist and other extremist activities: at least 150 convictions in 2024
• Article 24.23 CAO – Violation of the procedure for organizing mass events: 13,486 convictions between 2020 and 2024

The Belarusian government maintains a series of lists, regularly adding individual activists, opposition organizations, and independent content. Most of these lists are updated through extrajudicial procedures, based on discretionary decisions by designated state bodies. As of the end of 2024, these lists include:

• Republican List of Extremist Materials – 6,982 entries, including 2,012 Telegram resources. In 2024 alone, 2,424 information products were designated as “extremist materials,” among them 479 Telegram resources.
• List of Organizations, Formations, and Individual Entrepreneurs Involved in Extremist Activities – 253 entities designated as such by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) or the State Security Committee (KGB), as well as 2 organizations designated by court decisions. This list includes 35 independent media outlets and news platforms. In 2024, the list expanded by 87 new “extremist formations.”
• List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens, and Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities – 4,826 individuals, including citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Germany, Estonia, Mongolia, Hungary, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. In 2024, 1,188 people were added, while 20 individuals were removed from the list.

• List of organizations and individuals involved in terrorist activities – 1,212 individuals, including 517 citizens of Belarus, as well as 4 citizens of Ukraine, 3 citizens of the Russian Federation, 1 citizen of Latvia, and 1 citizen of Germany, who were added to the list due to their opposition to the Belarusian regime. In 2024, the list expanded by 146 individuals, including 127 added on political grounds. Additionally, in 2024, one Belarusian organization was added to the list, bringing the total number of organizations included on political grounds to five.
• Restricted access list – nearly 14,000 internet resources, more than 5,000 of which have been designated as “extremist materials” and/or “extremist formations.”
• List of printed publications containing informational messages and/or materials whose distribution could harm the national interests of the Republic of Belarus – 35 banned printed publications.

Persecution for “extremism”: new practices and trends

In 2024, the Belarusian authorities expanded the application of “anti-extremist” legislation, targeting new forms of civic activity and tightening control over public space. The expanded repressive measures now encompass not only criminal and administrative prosecution but also tools of surveillance, censorship, and propaganda aimed at suppressing dissent. Below are the key trends and developments in the persecution for “extremism.”

Prosecution for comments, reposts, and other online activity

The online space remained the primary area where Belarusian authorities aggressively applied “anti-extremist” legislation in 2024. The government continued to prosecute individuals for comments, reposts, likes, and other forms of online activity, labeling them as “extremist activity.”

Since nearly all independent media and opposition resources have been designated as “extremist materials,” sharing virtually any information unfavorable to the authorities can be deemed a violation. Moreover, most individuals are prosecuted for actions involving such materials even before they were officially declared “extremist.” For example, in 2024, priest Andrzej Juchniewicz was convicted at least four consecutive times, receiving a total of 60 days of administrative detention, with each case addressing a separate “prohibited” subscription or repost.

Comments criticizing the current regime or Belarus’ involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continued to be classified as “inciting enmity.” On 8 April 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced Aliaksei Herman to five years in prison for allegedly writing messages “aimed at escalating social tensions and destabilizing the situation in the Republic of Belarus.”

Repression against alleged administrators of small, local opposition Telegram channels intensified. On 21 October 2024, the Mahiliou Regional Court sentenced Maksim Chvashchynski from Babrujsk to seven years in prison for “creating an extremist formation” after he was found guilty of creating two local pro-democracy Telegram chats, “Babrujsk 375” and “Babr 97%”.

Persecution also continued against individuals who gave interviews to independent media. On 3 September 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced historian Ihar Mielnikau to four years in prison for giving an interview to Euroradio, which was declared an “extremist formation” five months after the interview had taken place.

Human rights defenders have documented criminal prosecutions for a wide range of online activities, including registering in chatbots, joining opposition chats, creating videos, participating in online education programs, taking part in online shows, sharing information on military and police movements, developing software for pro-democracy organizations, posting TikTok videos about social issues, doxxing government officials, engaging in chat roulette conversations, and messaging Belarusian military units fighting in Ukraine.

Repost as a crime

On 6 May 2024, a pro-government Telegram channel reported the initiation of the first criminal case under Article 361-4 of the CC (“aiding extremist activity”) for sharing “extremist” information in messaging apps – an act that was previously considered only an administrative offense.

Mass trials in absentia

In 2024, the use of special (in absentia) criminal proceedings significantly expanded compared to 2022–2023. This procedure is now applied not only against well-known political and civil society leaders but also against private individuals who have previously expressed dissent against the regime’s policies. For example, on 22 February 2024, the IC initiated special proceedings against nine participants of protest actions in Minsk, some of whom had never been previously detained or prosecuted.

The year was marked by the initiation of multiple large-scale trials in absentia, in which hundreds of Belarusian diaspora activists were indicted at once. On 20 March 2024, the IC opened a criminal case against 100 individuals associated with the organizations People’s Embassies and Belarusians Abroad, while on 16 May 2024, another case was initiated against 104 Belarusians for celebrating Freedom Day abroad.

“Conveyor” in absentia verdicts were also documented. On 1 July 2024, the Minsk Regional Court issued a mass in absentia verdict against 20 representatives of Belarusian civil society, whom government reports referred to as “Tsikhanouskaya’s analysts.”

First death sentence for a foreign national on “extremism” charges

For the first time in the post-election period, a foreign national was sentenced to death on “extremist” charges. In late June 2024, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced German citizen Rico Krieger to capital punishment for allegedly sabotaging railway tracks at Ozerishche station. However, he was later pardoned and extradited to Germany.

First conviction for “denying the genocide of the Belarusian people”

In autumn 2024, the first-ever conviction for “denying the genocide of the Belarusian people” was handed down. On 30 October 2024, the Minsk City Court sentenced 54-year-old Minsk resident Andrei Savicki to three years in prison under Article 130-2 of the CC, as well as under Article 368 CC for defamation of Lukashenka.

According to the prosecution, Savicki was an administrator of a group on Odnoklassniki, where he allegedly “posted a text denying the mass killing of civilians in the village of Khatyn by soldiers of the 118th Schutzmannschaft Battalion and the SS special battalion of Oskar Dirlewanger during a punitive operation on 22 March 1943, when 149 citizens of the BSSR, including 75 children, were burned alive and shot.”

This legal provision has become yet another tool for the authorities to restrict freedom of expression and historical discourse. More details on the Law on the Genocide of the Belarusian People in the context of human rights standards can be found in our analysis.

Mass convictions for alleged cooperation with Ukrainian intelligence services

The year 2024 saw a series of harsh sentences for “terrorism,” “high treason,” and “espionage” related to alleged sabotage operations and other forms of cooperation with Ukrainian intelligence. According to law enforcement agencies, these activities were allegedly coordinated by Ukrainian security services. Some examples include:

• On 11 April 2024 the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced Belarusian Vadzim Patsenka to 21 years in prison and Russian citizen Aliaksei Kulikou to 23 years in prison for allegedly planning sabotage operations in Hrodna Region.
• On 4 October 2024 the Minsk City Court issued sentences of up to 25 years in prison in the case of the “Machulishchy terrorist attack” against individuals accused of attacking a military aircraft.
• On 23 October 2024 the Homiel Regional Court sentenced Ukrainian nationals Siarhei and Pavel Kabarchuk to 20 years in prison for allegedly smuggling explosives across the Belarus–Ukraine border for sabotage purposes.
• On 2 December 2024 the Homiel Regional Court sentenced Ukrainian citizen Viachaslau Barodzii and Belarusian Mikalai Lasouski to 10 years in prison, while Belarusian Valiantsina Polaz received 9 years in the case of the so-called “SBU accomplices.” They were also accused of smuggling weapons and explosives.

State-controlled television channels continued to air propaganda films about the alleged dismantling of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) networks. These networks were allegedly gathering information on strategic infrastructure and planning acts of sabotage.

First criminal conviction of a Catholic priest

For the first time since Soviet times, a Catholic priest in Belarus was sentenced on politically motivated charges. On 30 December 2024, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced Father Henrykh Akalatovich to 11 years in prison for “high treason” under Article 356 of the CC. Reports suggested that he had been accused of transferring “classified information” to unknown individuals, with the damages estimated at approximately €1 million.

Criminalization of support for political prisoners

Article 361-4 of the CC (“aiding extremist activity”) began to be actively used for issuing dozens of sentences against individuals expressing solidarity with political prisoners. This included sending letters of support, providing regular aid packages to those in detention, and engaging in volunteer activities. Most of those convicted were detained in January–February 2024, after the KGB conducted mass searches and arrests of relatives of political prisoners.

Regular financial transfers to individuals held in pre-trial detention on “extremist” charges were also reclassified as “extremist activity.” For example, on 9 August 2024, the Brest Regional Court sentenced 63-year-old pensioner Natallia Malets to 3.5 years in prison for making regular financial transfers to detainees. The case against her was initiated after authorities determined that she had made 125 financial transactions exclusively to individuals charged with “extremist crimes”, all of whom had been recognized as political prisoners by human rights organizations.

First criminal charges for “terrorism propaganda”

For the first time in human rights defenders’ monitoring history, authorities officially pressed charges under Article 289-1 of the CC (“terrorism propaganda”). On 5 December 2024, the IC initiated special (in absentia) proceedings against:

• Andrei Strizhak, head of the BYSOL initiative
• Aliaksandr Kuzmiankou, BYSOL team member
• Jaraslau Likhacheuski, BYSOL team member
• Aliaksandr Padhorny, BYSOL team member
• Aliaksei Liavonchyk, director and founder of the BY_help fund
• Aliaksandr Lapko, head of the Belarusian Youth Hub
• Aliaksandra Zhuk, activist and blogger

They were charged under 17 “extremist” articles of the CC, including Article 289-1 (“terrorism propaganda”).

In late March 2024, reports from pro-government sources indicated that arrests had been made for “justifying terrorism,” which falls under Article 289-1 CC, in connection with comments about the Moscow Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. However, at that time, official state communications did not mention formal charges being filed.

Criminal prosecution for donations despite “compensating damages”

The KGB and other state agencies continue to conduct mass “preventive conversations” with individuals who have made donations to solidarity funds. During these interrogations, individuals are coerced into signing a “voluntary confession”, transferring a sum to a government-controlled account that is ten times the amount of their donation, and presenting a receipt of payment to the KGB within ten days. Compliance with these demands often results in a document stating that no criminal case will be initiated. However, an increasing number of individuals report being repeatedly forced to “voluntarily compensate” their donations.

Even those who have made substantial “compensation” payments are not immune from criminal prosecution:

• On 17 July 2024 the Brest Regional Court sentenced 38-year-old illustrator Natallia Levaya to six years in prison and fined her 40,000 BYN (approximately $12,200) despite possessing a KGB-issued document confirming that she had already repaid her donations multiple times following a “preventive conversation.”
• In early 2024 a second trial was held against Aliaksandr Ziyazetdzinau for donating to “extremist” organizations. Financial authorities claimed that he had pleaded guilty, “compensated damages” amounting to 31 bitcoins (approximately $775,000), and submitted a pardon request to Aliaksandr Lukashenka. However, despite the compensation being 155 times the amount of the original donation, he was still subjected to another criminal case under Article 290-1 of the CC (“financing terrorist activities”).

First-ever conviction for monitoring court proceedings

For the first time, monitoring court hearings was classified as “aiding extremist activity” under Article 361-4 of the CC. On 22 November 2024, pro-government sources reported that a 41-year-old volunteer court observer from Brest, Vital Chopik, was sentenced to seven years in prison and fined 1,000 base units (over $12,000) for regularly attending trials on “extremist” criminal cases, recording court proceedings, and forwarding this information to “foreign coordinators.”

Posthumous convictions for World War II crimes

For the first time in Belarus, two posthumous convictions were issued against deceased individuals accused of war crimes during World War II:

• The Supreme Court found Uladzimir Katryuk, who passed away in 2015 in Canada, guilty of participating in punitive operations and mass executions of civilians during the Nazi occupation.
• The court also convicted Kanstantsin Smouski, who died in 1960 in the United States, of collaborating with Nazi forces as part of the 118th Schutzmannschaft Battalion, which was responsible for killing over 430 people in Belarus.

Both men were convicted under Article 127 of the CC(“genocide”), but no punishments were imposed due to their deaths.

First convictions under new law on “foreign gratuitous aid”

For the first time, Article 24.15 of the CAO, which penalizes receiving “foreign gratuitous aid” for extremist activities, was applied. According to HRC “Viasna,” at least 150 people were convicted under this article in 2024, after the KGB conducted mass searches and detentions of relatives of political prisoners who had received food parcels through the “I need help BY” initiative.

First prosecution of a police officer for “extremist materials”

For the first time, a serving police officer was prosecuted under Article 19.11 of the CAO (“distribution of extremist materials”). In March 2024, a Brest police officer was arrested and sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention for subscribing to a banned Facebook group.

New “extremist” list – books deemed harmful to national interests

The Ministry of Information introduced a new blacklist of printed materials, officially titled the List of printed publications containing informational messages and/or materials whose distribution could harm the national interests of the Republic of Belarus. This list includes:

• Manga
• LGBTQ+ literature
• Erotic fiction
• Unofficial historical works about Belarus

First LGBTQ+ resource labeled as “extremist”

For the first time, an LGBTQ+ website was designated as “extremist material.” On 28 March 2024, authorities issued a decision declaring the social media accounts of the “TG HOUSE” community as “extremist materials”. The organization’s mission was to support and advocate for the well-being and rights of the transgender community in Belarus.

Conscription counseling classified as “extremism”

For the first time in recorded monitoring history, websites providing conscription counseling were designated as “extremist materials.” On 11 June 2024, it was reported that following a review by the General Prosecutor’s Office, the website povestka.org and its Instagram and Telegram accounts were declared “extremist.” According to the Prosecutor’s Office, such organizations allegedly “pose a threat to national security.”

“Extremism” as a propaganda tool

In 2024, Belarusian authorities increasingly utilized state enterprises, organizations, and educational institutions as platforms for promoting the state’s “fight against extremism.” Universities and enterprises regularly hosted “preventive” lectures and discussions aimed at fostering loyalty to the state and suppressing critical thinking. Law enforcement representatives warned students, schoolchildren, and workers about “external enemies,” the dangers of so-called destructive online resources, and the “extremist ideology” allegedly spread by the opposition and independent media. Special emphasis was placed on preventing participation in protests and discouraging subscriptions to banned Telegram channels.

Authorities also increasingly forced students to attend court hearings against individuals accused of “extremist” crimes. A significant component of these “preventive efforts” was the organization of “dialogue platforms” and thematic exhibitions centered on the “genocide of the Belarusian people,” which even extended into penal institutions.State television continued broadcasting propaganda segments that, under the guise of combating “extremism,” portrayed an external threat narrative and claimed prevention of terrorist acts allegedly organised by Western intelligence services and the opposition abroad. These materials depicted civil society representatives and independent journalists as “extremists” and “traitors” working in the interests of foreign states, while any form of civic activism was framed as a potential national security threat.